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Abstract
This paper presents a smart Transactive energy (TE) framework in which home mi-
crogrids (H-MGs) can collaborate with each other in a multiple H-MG system by
forming coalitions for gaining competitiveness in the market. Profit allocation due
to coalition between H-MGs is an important issue for ensuring the optimal use of
installed resources in the whole multiple H-MG system. In addition, considering
demand fluctuations, energy production based on renewable resources in the mul-
tiple H-MG can be accomplished by demand-side management strategies that try
to establish mechanisms to allow for a flatter demand curve. In this regard, de-
mand shifting potential can be tapped through shifting certain amounts of energy
demand from some time periods to others with lower expected demand, typically
to match price values and to ensure that existing generation will be economically
sufficient. It is also possible to obtain the maximum profit with the coalition for-
mation. In essence the impact of the consumption shifting in the multiple H-MG
schedule can be considered while conducting both individual and coalition opera-
tions. A comprehensive simulation study is carried out to reveal the effectiveness of
Email address: mousa.marzband@northumbria.ac.uk Corresponding author (Mousa
Marzband)
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the proposed method in lowering the market clearing price (MCP) for about 15%
of the time intervals, increasing H-MG responsive load consumption by a factor of
30%, and promoting local generation by a factor of three. The numerical results
also show the capability of the proposed algorithm to encourage market participa-
tion and improve profit for all participants.
Keywords: Coalition formation, demand side management, electricity market,
home energy management system, home Microgrid, profit allocation, Transactive
Energy.
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Nomenclature
Acronyms
ABC artificial bee colony
CHP combined heat and power
EB electrical boiler
EHP electrical heat pump
ES+/ES- energy storage (ES) during charging/discharging mode
GB gas boiler
UG+/UG- buying/ selling power from/to H-MG i/ the upstream grid
(UG)
MCP market clearing price
RLD+, RLD- amount of responsive load demand (RLD) that goes/come
from/to other time period to/from t
STP solar thermal panel
TES thermal energy storage
WT wind turbine
Symbols
@ the coalition formation among the H-MGs i and j (j6=i)
{A@B}≡{AB} coalition formation between H-MGs A and B
{A} H-MG A is in individual operation
k 7−→ i distributed energy resource (DER) k installed in H-MG i
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Indices
i+, i- buying/ selling power from/to H-MG j/H-MG i
e/h/D electrical/ thermal/ non-responsive load demand
i∈{ES-,WT,CHP,GB,STP,EHP,EB,TES-,UG-}, {i,j,k}∈{1,2,· · · ,n}, j6=i
j all H-MG except H-MG i
Constants
α, β amount of demand that will be added/subtracted to/from the
primary demand forecast for relevant hours
ζk,ie , ζ
k,i
h electrical/ thermal efficiency of the thermal DER k in H-MG i
(%)
P
k,i
e , P
k,i
h maximum electrical/thermal power generated by
dispatchable/non-dispatchable DER k in H-MG i (kW)
ping natural fuel price offer (£/kWh)
ζTES heat loss efficiency value (%)
SOCx, SOC
x
the lower/ upper limit of state-of-charge (SOC) in x (x∈{ES,
TES}) (%)
SOCES,iINI , SOC
TES,i
INI the initial value of ES/TES SOC in H-MG i (%)
S the collector surface area
a1, a2 the first/ second order thermal loss coefficients (kWm2/k0)
η0 the zero thermal loss efficiency
κ part of excess/ shortage power generated/ required by H-MG
i/ upstream grid
Parameters
P˜STP,it,h the predicted generated thermal power by STP at time t in
H-MG i (kW)
P˜WT,it,e the predicted generated power by WT at time t in H-MG i (kW)
P˜D,it,e , P˜
D,i
t,h the predicted consumed electrical/thermal load demand at
time t in H-MG i (kW)
λ˜MCPt,e , λ˜
MCP
t,h the electrical/thermal of MCP at time t (£/kWh)
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G?t the solar radiation (kW/m
2)
Temct , Tem
a
t the collector mean/ ambient temperature
Decision variables
Pk,it,e, P
k,i
t,h thermal/electrical power generated/ consumed by
dispatchable/non-dispatchable DER k in H-MG i (kW)
pik,it,e, pi
k,i
t,h electrical/ thermal price bids of dispatchable/non-
dispatchable DER k in H-MG i (£/kW)
XCHP,it binary variable, 1 means CHP on, otherwise CHP off
FUk,it fuel consumption rate of dispatchable DER k in H-MG i at time
t (kW)
PRLD+,it,e , P
RLD-,i
t,e the value of added RLD consumed load in time interval t
(RLD+) and shifted load to another time interval (RLD-)
λMCPt,e , λ
MCP
t,h the electrical/thermal of MCP calculated by ABC-1 unit at time
t (£/kWh)
λ′MCPt,e , λ
′MCP
t,h the electrical/thermal of MCP calculated by ABC-2 unit at time
t (£/kWh)
P
i+,j
t,e , P
i+,j
t,h , P
i−,j
t,e ,
P
i−,j
t,h ∀j 6= i
the electrical/ thermal power sold/bought from/to H-MG i/H-
MG j at time t (kW)
PUG+,it,e , P
UG-,i
t,e the value of power sold/ bought from/to upstream grid/ H-
MG i at time t (kW)
1. Introduction1
While smart grids are known as the future of power systems, home Microgrids2
(H-MG) can be considered as a vital technology to deliver the functional blocks of3
smart grid on a local scale. In developing this system, a large number of elements,4
currently just passively connected to the grid, will become actively involved in ne-5
gotiation and complex coordination tasks [1–3]. The big challenge for executives is6
how to handle an unbounded number of intelligent elements, each with their own7
objectives and perspectives, into a cohesive and efficient system [4–6]. In this con-8
text, Transactive energy (TE) concepts and adaptation into the distribution-level of9
5
the electricity grid can be profoundly effective; thus, is considered as an area of10
recent research interest [7]. Indeed, TE is facilitated by a set of intrinsically trans-11
ferable and shared economic and control mechanisms that guarantees equilibrium12
between supply and demand among trading partners in the entire electrical infras-13
tructure [8, 9].14
In addition, clusters of actively managed H-MGs may be grouped together into15
so-called energy coalitions in the multiple H-MG [10–13] for participation in local16
or system-wide energy and power system services markets. Formation of such coali-17
tions may be beneficial for operators of the multiple H-MG. As a result, they may18
reduce transaction costs of participation in such markets, reduce uncertainty (given19
the benefits from aggregation and diversity in energy demand and supply, especially20
in the presence of variable renewables) and avoid the grid usage fees through lo-21
cal energy trading [14–17]. For society as a whole, formation of such coalitions22
can also be beneficial as day-ahead coordinated market participation of H-MGs can23
reduce price volatility and average price levels through increased market liquidity,24
improved reliability and reduced peaks in demand from the upstream grid; thus,25
potentially expensive investment can be avoided [18–21].26
Coalitions may be formed or broken depending on the conditions of the mo-27
ment [22]. For example, a group of H-MGs may conclude they can achieve more28
profit at a particular moment through cooperation and hence form a coalition. At29
a future time, H-MGs may decide that higher profit may be achieved by breaking30
the coalition and forming an alternative coalition, or possibly even by operating in-31
dependently. Assuming that the considered H-MGs are rational economic entities,32
cooperation can only be implemented if each rational player can expect to obtain a33
higher profit by joining the coalition. A crucial consideration in the decision to join34
a coalition is therefore the mechanism through which coalition profit is allocated,35
once the coalition can extract value from market participation. If the mechanism36
employed by a coalition for allocating profit is perceived to be unfair, the result of37
the coalition forming process may be sub-optimal, for both individual H-MG and38
the coalition as a whole. Hence, it is necessary to find a way to fairly allocate the39
profit obtained from the coalition among all players. In the method proposed in40
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this paper, it is shown that because of the ineffectiveness of the independent de-41
cisions, H-MGs may have interest in cooperating with each other by coordinating42
their energy supplies and the demand rate consumption, which leads to an increase43
in their aggregated utilities. As a result, the pay-off of each H-MG can be increased44
by cooperation. In this context, it is worth mentioning that since some players may45
contribute more to the coalition than others or may exhibit different bargaining46
power exchange methods for transactive energy balance etc. This raises the follow-47
ing key questions:48
1. How should the generated surplus be distributed among the players (i.e. each49
H-MG) for any particular coalition?50
2. How important is each player to the overall cooperation?51
Furthermore, it is important to consider responsive load demand (RLD) in H-MG52
which can be defined as the change in electric usage by a customer from the normal53
consumption pattern in response to the electricity price variations over time, or to54
the incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high55
wholesale market prices [10, 23]. RLD models presented in the literature generally56
refer to the quantification of the RLD potential with highly increasing penetration57
rate of renewable energy sources and load demand into the electrical power grids58
[24, 25]. However, the methodology proposed in this paper goes further on mak-59
ing possible for the consumers to participate in the consumption shifting scheme60
under coalition formation in multiple H-MG systems. It also allows H-MGs to ade-61
quately manage the coalition formation process together with RLD programming.62
In addition, the characteristics of distributed energy resource (DER) with RLD re-63
sources integrated inside each H-MG are taken into account, respectively as input64
parameters and technical constraints of the optimization model. It is developed to65
perform a joint between both H-MG and RLD resources scheduling under coalition66
formation, in a multiple H-MG architecture.67
In this paper, a multi-stage stochastic programming based on artificial bee colony68
(MSSP-ABC) algorithm is applied for multiple H-MG applications, to simulate the69
formation of possible coalitions. A local home energy management system is im-70
plemented in the control centre by using an MSSP-ABC algorithm. According to71
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the several advantages of ABC such as simplicity, accuracy and short calculation72
time [26–28], it is applied in this paper for the optimization of the multiple H-MG73
operation in terms of performance, generation scheduling, and economic power74
dispatch. This can provide economic results with excellent reliability because of its75
high convergence speed and ability of finding general optimum solution compared76
with other innovative optimum methods (e.g. gravitational search algorithm, ant77
colony optimization, imperialist competition algorithm) [26]. The total profit of78
each possible coalition from participation in a distributed energy market is also79
calculated. Subsequently, the cooperation of H-MGs is discussed and an algorithm80
based on MSSP-ABC is implemented for deciding coalition formation. The proposed81
algorithm is then used for logical and grid-wise distribution of profits for each of82
the H-MGs in the coalition.83
With regards to the proposed approach, H-MGs are able to reasonably predict84
in advance that how much gain they can obtain from participating in a coalition. In85
order to do that, each H-MG seeks to calculate its contribution of expected marginal86
value to the coalition. This value can then be used to assess the profitability of avail-87
able coalitions and inform the decision to join a coalition or not. Furthermore, a88
group of H-MGs can cooperate and form a larger coalition if this formation increases89
the pay-off of at least one of the H-MGs without decreasing the pay-off of any of the90
others involved in the coalition. In an analogous manner, a coalition can decide to91
split and divide itself into smaller coalitions if splitting is preferred by H-MGs.92
The main contribution of this paper is the development of a modeling frame-93
work for profit allocation across H-MG participating in HM-MG coalition which can94
answer the question of what a “fair” distribution of profit should be, and which95
coalitions are likely to form. Applications of the proposed concepts are various,96
from H-MG portfolio design to optimal contract design by aggregators, H-MG oper-97
ators and energy service companies.98
An illustrative grid connected case study application with three electrical/thermal99
coupled H-MGs is presented here to demonstrate the models introduced. The differ-100
ent coalition formation rules are then compared with each other in order to evaluate101
the profit that each H-MG that can be obtained by joining the coalition. The results102
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show that the disconnection of H-MGs resulting from pricing decisions allows them103
to collaborate together to achieve higher profits due to excess production and avoid104
penalties due to production shortages. It is also demonstrated that significant in-105
crease in the profit may persuade H-MGs to form a coalition.106
In summary, the main contributions in this work are as follows:107
1. The formulation of a particular coalition formation strategy combined with108
RLD programming based on framework of TE;109
2. The formulation of a special demand side management (DSM) strategy based110
on solving optimization problem for maximizing the total profit of a multiple111
H-MG system by taking into account the variable uncertainties;112
3. The development of a modeling framework for profit allocation across H-MG113
participating in multiple H-MG coalition to have a “fair” profit distribution.114
This paper is organized as follows:115
The proposed algorithm is developed and explained in Section 2 while concep-116
tual design of the proposed problem is outlined in Section 3. Simulation results and117
discussions are presented in Section 4. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 5.118
2. Proposed MSSP-ABC algorithm119
A general picture of the multiple H-MG connected to the several conventional120
building (CB) is shown in Figure 1. Multiple H-MG is designed as an active cluster121
of H-MGs and each of them is configured by dispatchable/non-dispatchable DER122
resources, storage devices and associated RLDs. Non-dispatchable DERs (such as123
wind and photovoltaic resources) are based on renewable energy resources which124
inherently suffer from a lack of the dispatch capability due to inherent stochastic125
behaviours of these resources. Under these conditions, each H-MG having an ag-126
gregator has the ability of supplying its power shortage from other H-MGs. CBs are127
the buyers of power from multiple H-MG and/or upstream grid and their consumed128
loads are uncontrollable. When an H-MG has the excess generation, it has the abil-129
ity of selling power to other H-MGs within multiple H-MG system, the upstream130
grid and CBs connected to this system. This excess power can be allocated to sup-131
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ply each of them according to the terms of their bids. Otherwise, when an H-MG132
has the generation shortage, it means that it does not have the ability of supplying133
its internal demand and must import power from other H-MGs and the upstream134
grid and/or possibly shift the loads. The operation and management of the cor-135
responding H-MG can be controlled and monitored by a control centre as shown136
in Figure 1. A control strategy is developed in the control centre for coordinated137
operation of networked H-MGs in a multiple H-MG distribution system. The con-138
trol centre is considered as a distinct entity with individual objectives to maximize139
the profit for all H-MGs taking into account the possibility of coalition formation140
between them.141
The flowchart of the proposed algorithm is shown in Figure 2. Various parame-142
ters such as load demand, renewable power generation, and MCP are treated as un-143
certainties in the proposed structure. In order to handle the uncertainties, Taguchi′s144
orthogonal array testing (TOAT) approach is utilized which enhances a trade-off be-145
tween the accuracy of the solution and the computational burden [10, 29, 30]. The146
TOAT method selects the minimum number of scenarios while preserving the main147
statistical information of the entire dataset. More details on the stochastic frame-148
work of this study can be found in [31–34]. As observed in Figure 2, this structure149
is made up of TOAT, ABC-1, DSM-ABC, ABC-2 and MCP units. Since the TOAT and150
MCP units are explained in detail in [10], only the ABC-1, DSM-ABC and ABC-2151
units are discussed in the following. At first, the rated capacity of the existing DERs152
and their operational constraints will be required to exhibit ABC algorithm. Then,153
prediction data including solar radiation, wind speed, electrical/thermal load de-154
mand and the electricity price will be sent to the TOAT unit. Then, ABC-1 unit is155
executed for determining the value of MCP-1. After calculating the MCP-1 value,156
demand side management is again conducted to deliver both energy efficiency gains157
and peak demand reductions based on the objective function defined in ABC-2 unit.158
After levelling the load demand curve and assuring the MCP reduction due to im-159
plementation the RLD program, MCP-2 is calculated and is declared to the market160
operator.161
In Figure 2 the solid black lines show the execution trend of ABC-1 unit and162
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dashed grey lines state the execution of ABC-2 unit for determining MCP-2 1.163
2.1. ABC-1 unit164
Input information: P˜STP,it,h , P˜
WT,i
t,e , P˜
D,i
t,e , P˜
D,i
t,h , λ˜
MCP
t,e , λ˜
MCP
t,h .165
Variables: Produced electrical/thermal power by the generation resources, ES166
and TES charge/discharge power, electrical/thermal power exchanged between H-167
MGs and upstream grid, all the buying/selling offers related to DERs, H-MGs and168
the consumers, binary variables, λMCPt,e , and λ
MCP
t,h .169
Objectives: Determining the electrical/thermal optimum values of the gener-170
ated power such that the profit obtained by these resources becomes maximum.171
The defined objectives in this unit are to maximize the profit, resulting from the172
H-MGs individual operation or interactive performance under different coalition173
formation patterns, to achieve electrical/thermal balance, as well as to improve the174
SOC condition in ES/ TES.175
2.2. DSM-ABC unit176
Input information: PD,it,e, λ
MCP
t,e .177
Variables: PRLD+t,e , P
RLD-
t,e .178
Objectives: to smooth demand curve applying a strategy that considers the179
shifting of certain amounts of energy demand from some time periods (with higher180
MCP) to other time periods with lower expected demand (lower MCP), typically in181
response to price signals.182
2.3. ABC-2 unit183
Input information: PSTP,it,h , P
WT,i
t,e , P
D,i
t,e , P
D,i
t,h , P
RLD+,i
t,e , P
RLD-,i
t,e , λ
MCP
t,e , λ
MCP
t,h .184
Variables: Pk,it,e, P
k,i
t,h, pi
k,i
t,e, pi
k,i
t,h, X
CHP,i
t , FU
k,i
t , P
RLD+,i
t,e , P
RLD-,i
t,e , λ
′MCP
t , λ
′MCP
t ,185
P
i+,j
t,e , P
i+,j
t,h , P
i−,j
t,e , P
i−,j
t,h , P
UG+,i
t,e and P
UG-,i
t,e .186
1The solid black lines demonstrate the execution trend of Stage 1, the solid gray lines indicate Stage
2 and dashed grey lines state the execution of Stage 3.
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H-MG #1 H-MG #2 H-MG #N
Electrical line
Non-dispatchable DER
Dispatchable DER
ES
RLD
CB #1 CB #2 CB #K
Thermal line
Control Centre
CB: Conventional building
Figure 1: General structure of multiple H-MG
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Initialization
TOAT unit
ABC-1 unit
MCP unit
Solar irradiation Load demandwind speed MCP
ABC-2 unit
Input prediction data
MCP MCP
t,e t,h,l l
DSM-ABC unit
Stage #3Stage #2Stage #1
MCP MCP
t,e t,h,¢ ¢l l
Figure 2: Proposed MSSP-ABC algorithm
Objectives: Determining the amount of consumers participation of in RLD pro-187
gram and the value of the power produced by generation resources such that their188
profit becomes maximum.189
To achieve these objectives, load demand profile improvement is considered by190
using λMCPt,e and λ
MCP
t,h . Under these conditions, shifted load demand (i.e. RLD-) from191
time interval with higher MCP (peak hours) is evenly distributed among lower MCP192
(off-peak hours) by using ABC-2 unit. In addition, the quantity of shifted load at193
each hour is proportional to the demand at that hour.194
The performance of demand side management proposed by ABC-2 unit has been195
shown in Figure 3. As it can be seen, when the MCP value goes up to a certain limit,196
ABC-2 unit could reasonably assume that further optimization efforts with a demand197
shifting rate would improve the load demand profile while all the constraints of the198
system are satisfied.199
To achieve these objectives, the active participation of consumers in total load200
demand profile improvement is increasingly seen politically desirable, especially201
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any voluntary RLD program taking λMCPt,e and λ
MCP
t,h into consideration. For this im-202
plementation, ABC-2 unit is developed to shift load demand from time period t to203
sometime before and/or after time t. It can be a way to induce lower electricity con-204
sumption at times of high MCP, during peak electricity demand, in a cost-effective205
manner or when system reliability is jeopardized.206
On the other hand, a certain RLD amount income is verified by ABC-2 unit in pe-207
riod t, shifted from other periods. At the end, in period t, considering the consump-208
tion shifting (incoming: RLD+/outgoing: RLD-) and the consumption reduction,209
the final consumption can be lower or higher than the initially expected demand210
depending on the objective. It is important to keep in mind that the total consump-211
tion can be dropped to less than the initially expected demand. This case will occur212
if the appliance electricity consumption cannot be shifted from other periods to this213
period.214
In essence, the proposed MSSP-ABC algorithm with the novel RLD criterion con-215
sisting of ABC-1 and ABC-2 units will be found to be reliable, efficient and cost-216
effective.217
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The value of excess load in this region 
must transfer to other time intervals 
by using ABC-2 algorithm.
In these intervals the MCP value is 
high and load demand value in these 
time intervals must transfer to other 
intervals in which MCP is less.
Figure 3: Method of demand side management based on MCP in the ABC-2 unit
2.4. MCP unit218
In this unit, the MCP is calculated based on the schedules obtained from ABC-219
1 and ABC-2 units and the supply and demand bids submitted by the participants220
using forward market with double-side auction [35–38]. Supply and demand bids221
as well as optimal schedules of the participants are the parameters given to the222
MCP unit. The forward market aggregates supply and demand in the merit order as223
price-quantity pairs. The quantities are the optimal schedules obtained from ABC-224
1 and ABC-2 units, and the prices are the supply and demand bids submitted by225
the participants. As expected, the aggregated supply and demand quantity-price226
are monotonically increasing and decreasing step-wise curves, respectively. Then,227
the MCP will be the point of aggregated supply and demand curves intersection.228
Subsequently, the value of the payoff function for each participant can be computed229
using the MCP unit.230
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Figure 4: schematic of the system under study
3. Problem formulation231
To illustrate how the proposed method works, it is applied to a case study for232
the multiple H-MG depicted in Figure 4. As shown in this figure, multiple H-233
MG comprises three different H-MGs A, B and C with various dispatchable/non-234
dispatchable DER resources. As observed in this figure, the resources storing elec-235
trical/thermal power are included in A and B for storing provided excess electri-236
cal/thermal power. At the beginning of the planning horizon, each H-MG decides237
whether to operate individually or in coalition with other H-MGs, and determines238
the selling price offered to the consumers to be used during the planning horizon.239
After fixing the H-MGs operation status as individual (i.e. {A},{B},{C}&{UG}) or240
coalitional (i.e. {AB},{AC},{BC} which are double coalition and {ABC} which is a241
triple coalition) and the buying/selling prices, each H-MG decides the amount of242
energy purchased/sold in the pool to/from other H-MGs to supply the demand of all243
its consumers during each period (e.g. one hour) over along the planning horizon244
(e.g. 24 hours). All other information about the capacity of equipment installed in245
each H-MG are presented in [10] in detail and therefore not repeated in this paper.246
At first, the objective functions for the case study are described and then the main247
results of applying the proposed algorithm are presented and discussed.248
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3.1. Objective functions249
The objective functions defined in both ABC-1 and ABC-2 units are based on250
decision making problem related to maximizing solitary profit of each H-MG in251
independent working conditions or the profit resulting from their participation in252
coalitional cooperation among each other. With this difference that the value of253
the profit resulting from the participation of the consumers in the RLD program has254
been included in the objective function of problem ABC-2 unit. In the following255
paragraphs, the mathematical model of the discussed problem has been presented256
in this paper.257
An multi-stage decision-making problem with the defined objective functions in258
both ABC-1 and ABC-2 units is employed in MSSP-ABC algorithm. This problem259
is constrained by a collection of market clearing problems representing pool trad-260
ing, and its individual objective functions corresponding to profit maximization. To261
reach this aim, an MSSP-ABC algorithm is developed to include additional profit for262
the players who are involved in a deregulated power market environment. In this263
direction, the mathematical model represents the equilibrium of a pool-based mar-264
ket taking into account the outcomes on the spot market based on expected profit265
maximization for H-MGs; and the anticipation of the upstream grid or H-MGs for266
achieving success and earning more profit under collation formation. The demand267
is considered exogenous but supply bids and the power generation of DERs are268
obtained as endogenous variables of the model. The optimization problem of this269
model seeks maximum profit for H-MGs considering coalition formation between270
them and contains H-MGs, DERs and RLD scheduling constraints, when the day-271
ahead energy market [39] can be cleared under different operating conditions to272
deal with profit maximization problems of all H-MGs. The proposed structure pro-273
vides a procedure to derive the optimal offering strategy of all players including H-274
MGs, DERs of them and upstream grid. In this direction, an H-MG can decide about275
its level of involvement in the future pool markets as well as the selling/buying price276
offered to/from other H-MGs with the goal of maximizing the expected profit. The277
mathematical formulation of the optimization problem is presented as follows.278
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3.1.1. Objective function in ABC-1 unit279
Different scenarios which have been considered for defining objective functions280
are as follows:281
• Profit resulting from H-MG i under individual operation282283
Profiti|∀i = max
24∑
t=1
∑
∀k7−→i
(Pk,it,e × pik,it,e + Pk,it,h × pik,it,h)
+
∑
∀j6=i
 Pi−,jt,e × pii−,jt,e + Pi−,jt,h × pii−,jt,h
−(Pi+,jt,e × pii+,jt,e + Pi+,jt,h × pii+,jt,h )

+PUG+,it,e × piUG+,it,e − PUG-,it,e × piUG-,it,e

× ∆t
−
∑
∀k7−→i
FUk,it × ping
(1)
The first right side term of Eq. 1 states the income value resulting from the284
production of electrical/thermal powers produced by the DER k existing in285
H-MG i. The right side term section is equivalent to the value of paid cost286
for supplying the fuel required by thermal resources. Section three states the287
income from selling electrical/thermal powers sold to other H-MGs minus the288
cost of buying electrical/thermal powers from other H-MGs for the completion289
of its function of the power required in the H-MG i. The last term of the290
equation shows the value of electrical power bought from the upstream grid291
for supplying the H-MG i load demand.292
• Profit resulting from H-MG i and H-MG j (j 6=i) considering coalition for-293
mation between them2945 ∑
∀t
Profit =
∑
∀t
Profiti@
∑
∀t
Profitj, ∀j 6= i (2)
• Profit resulting from upstream grid296297
ProfitUG =
∑
∀i,t
(PUG+,it,e × piUG+,it,e − PUG-,it,e × piUG-,it,e ) (3)
3.1.2. Objective function in ABC-2 unit298
The objective functions defined in this part of simulation problem are exactly299
similar to objective functions defined for ABC-1 unit with this difference that300
profit value resulting from the consumer′s participation in RLD program must301
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also be considered. Because of this, the following expression must be added302
to all the Eqs. 1-3:303
• Profit resulting from RLD program304305
ProfitRLDt = P
RLD+,i
t × piRLD+,it − PRLD-,it × piRLD-,it (4)
3.2. Technical and economic constraints306
• Supply bids307
pik,i
e/h
6 pik,i
t,e/h 6 pi
k,i
e/h
(5)
where pik,i
e/h
and pik,i
e/h
are respectively the minimum and maximum offer of308
the electrical/thermal price in the ith H-MG. pik,ie can be considered the equiv-309
alent of the value of predicting electrical MCP of the day before implement-310
ing uncertainty. pik,ie can be considered zero for renewable resources and311
for resources which consume fuel, can be estimated by calculating electrical312
marginal cost value (MCe) of the desired resource. MCe for fuel consuming313
resource is calculated from the following equation:314315
MCk,it,e =
Pk,it,e
ζk,ie
× ping (6)
Also, pik,ih can be considered the equivalent of thermal marginal cost value316
(MCh) and can be calculated by317318
MCk,it,h =
Pk,it,h
ζk,ih
× ping (7)
• ES and TES constraints [26]319
For modelling ES and TES constraints such as stored energy limitations, max-320
imum power charge/discharge limitations and power equilibrium have been321
considered.3223
PESe 6 PES,it,e 6 P
ES
e (8)
324
SOCES 6 SOCES,it 6 SOC
ES
(9)
325
SOCES,it = SOC
ES,i
t−1 +
PES,it,e
P
ES
e
(10)
326
SOCES,it=1 = SOC
ES
INI (11)
327
PTESh 6 PTES,it,h 6 P
TES
h (12)
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328
SOCTES 6 SOCTES,it 6 SOC
TES
(13)
329
SOCTES,it = SOC
TES,i
t−1 +
PTES,it,h
P
TES
h
(14)
330
SOCTES,it=1 = SOC
TES
INI (15)
• CHP constraints [40]331332
PCHP,ie 6 PCHP,it,e 6 P
CHP,i
e (16)
333
PCHP,it,e = FU
CHP,i
t × ζ1t,e + XCHP,it × ζ2t,e (17)
334
PCHP,it,h = FU
CHP,i
t × ζ1t,h + XCHP,it × ζ2t,h (18)
where the coefficients ζ1t,e and ζ
2
t,e can be determined as f(P
CHP,i
e ,P
CHP,i
e , ζt,e)335
and ζ1t,h and ζ
2
t,h can be calculated as f(P
CHP,i
h ,P
CHP,i
h , ζt,h) from interpola-336
tion of manufacturers′ curves of efficiency with respect to loading level and337
considering the full load electrical efficiency (i.e. ζt,e) and thermal efficiency338
(i.e. ζt,h).339
• EHP constraints [26]340341
PEHP,it,h = P
EHP,i
t,e × COPt (19)
where COPt is coefficient of performance.342343
0 6 PEHP,it,h 6 P
EHP
h (20)
• GB constraints [26]344345
0 6 PGB,it,h 6 P
GB
h (21)
346
PGB,it,h = ζ
GB,i
h × FUGB,it (22)
• STP constraints [26]347348
PSTP,it,h = S ·G?t(η0) −
a1(Temct − Tem
a
t )
G?t
−
a2(Temct − Tem
a
t )
2
G?t
(23)
where S is the collector surface area (corresponding to efficiency parameter)349
(m2), G? is the solar radiation ( kW
m2
). a1 and a2 are the first order and second350
order thermal loss coefficients ( kWm
2
k0
), Temct is the collector mean tempera-351
ture, η0 is the ambient temperature and is the zero thermal loss efficiency.352
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• WT constraints3534
0 6 PWT,it,e 6 P
WT,i
(24)
• Upstream grid constraints [10]355356
0 6 PUG+t,e 6 κ×
∑
∀i
PUG+,it,e (25)
357
0 6 PUG-t,e 6 κ×
∑
∀i
PUG-,it,e (26)
where κ is part of excess/ shortage power required by the H-MG i or upstream358
grid.359
• Electrical/thermal power balance in H-MG i360361
PD,it,e + P
ES+,i
t,e + P
EHP,i
t,e + P
EB,i
t,e +
∑
∀j 6=i
P
i+,j
t,e
+PUG-,it,e =
∑
∀j 6=i
P
i−,j
t,e + P
UG+,i
t,e + P
CHP,i
t,e + P
WT,i
t,e
(27)
362
PD,it,h + P
TES+,i
t,h +
∑
∀j 6=i
P
i+,j
t,h =
∑
∀j 6=i
P
i−,j
t,h +
PCHP,it,h + P
GB,i
t,h + P
EHP,i
t,h + P
EB,i
t,h + P
TES-,i
t,h
(28)
• Electrical/thermal power balance in multiple H-MG363364 ∑
∀i
(PD,it,e + P
ES+,i
t,e + P
EHP,i
t,e + P
EB,i
t,e + P
UG-,i
t,e )
= PCHP,it,e + P
WT,i
t,e
(29)
365 ∑
∀i
(PD,it,h + P
TES+,i
t,h ) =∑
∀i
(PCHP,it,h + P
GB,i
t,h + P
EHP,i
t,h + P
EB,i
t,h + P
TES-,i
t,h )
(30)
• RLD constraint3667
P′D,it,e = P˜
D,i
t,e + P
RLD+,i
t,e − P
RLD-,i
t,e , ∀P′D,it,e > 0 (31)
368
PRLD-,it,e 6 α× P˜D,it,e , PRLD+,it,e 6 β× P˜D,it,e (32)
369 ∑
∀i,t
PRLD+,it,e =
∑
∀i,t
PRLD-,it,e (33)
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4. Result and discussion370
This section presents an illustrative scenario to which the proposed MSSP-ABC371
algorithm has been applied under the possibility of individual operation and coali-372
tion formation of distributed H-MGs. The H-MGs schedule performed by a control373
centre which maximizes their own profit under individual operation or coalition374
formation, taking into account the resources′ constraints for each period.375
For demand side, the power consumption profile of each H-MG under different376
scenarios are shown in Figure 5(a) where the consumption load demand profiles377
are completely different in H-MG A during planning period under each scenario.378
There are foreseeable conditions in which could be possible that RLD+ might ex-379
ist in one scenario while RLD- can occur under another scenario during the same380
time interval around the daily peak consumption periods. For each RLD+ or RLD-381
event, the control centre has previously established the consumption reduction and382
shifting available in each consumption cluster, according to the chosen objective383
function (i.e. individual operation or coalition formation). It is also considered to384
allocate or maybe distribute the corresponding profit to each H-MG and upstream385
grid under different scenarios. The maximum consumption and shifting capacity386
can also be seen, so one can have an idea on how much consumption shifting could387
be additionally scheduled. As shown in Figure 5(a), the maximum value of RLD+388
is achieved at 13:00 o′clock because of the severe impact of purchasing power from389
upstream grid when MCP is cheap as shown in Figure 5(a). Under this condition,390
in addition to earning higher profit associated with DER resources in H-MG A, con-391
sumers in this H-MG have been increasingly getting benefited from having a role392
relating to RLD program during daily operation of the network. From Figure 5(a),393
the total amount of RLD+ consumption is seen to be more than 43% of the total394
amount of RLD- under all scenarios. In addition, its maximum value is about 53%395
while the scenario {AC} could have taken place during 24 hours of operation as396
seen in Figure 5(a). In this scenario, the necessary power needed to supply the397
consumers in H-MG C can be met by the DER resources existing in H-MG A. The398
excess generation in H-MG A can also be spent for feeding RLD+ in that or selling399
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to the upstream grid.400
The increase of RLD+ and RLD- in the H-MG B along the 24h of the day is al-401
most the same (about 41%), however, the maximum value of the difference between402
RLD+ and RLD- is about 51% when scenario {C} has occurred, because, in this sce-403
nario, the purchasing power from upstream grid by H-MGs B and C has increased404
significantly. While this is true for all scenarios, except for {UG} which shows a405
reduction around 21% relative to {C} as seen in Figure 5(b) and 5(c). In this case,406
the load is shifted from time periods when higher prices are expected, for instance407
the end of the day, to time periods with lower expected prices, e.g. night and some408
afternoon time periods. Thereby, when H-MGs tried to exchange power with each409
other while upstream grid is responding to hourly prices scheduling, ABC-2 unit has410
also performed at the same time to reduce more the peak load demand and flattens411
the total aggregated load curve of all H-MGs as seen from Figure 5(b). Another fea-412
ture of the effective coalition formation is also the management of energy balance,413
for scenarios where a limited and/or restricted electrical power is purchased from414
the upstream grid. For instance, as it can be seen in Figure 5(a), shifting a part of415
consumption to the night hours when prices are more favourable for H-MG A and B416
coalition formation leads to the reduction of RLD+ value relative to RLD- (around417
37%), although trend is reversed in H-MG C as seen in Figure 5(c) which shows418
the capability of the proposed algorithm to regulate energy balance feature under419
coalition formation processes.420
Analyzing load demand daily operation profiles provides insight into under-421
standing market behaviour of each H-MG, interactions between different H-MGs422
under different scenarios of individual operation and coalition formation, and also423
the arising flexibility. This is another key aspect/feature that are now about to424
explain market conditions and load demand correlations change throughout the425
day-ahead operation so the real value of flexible systems needs to be obtained by426
performing multiple H-MG operation analysis. This also enables the consideration427
for a distributed profit scenario for each H-MG under different conditions, and mon-428
itor the maximum consumption and shifting capacity.429
In the above, the values of λMCPt,e and λ
′MCP
t,e obtained by ABC-1 and ABC-2 units are430
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(a) H-MG A
(b) H-MG B
(c) H-MG C
Figure 5: Load profile of H-MG A, B and C under individual or coalition inter-operating conditions
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compared to address inter-operability between multiple-coalition in H-MGs. The431
demand side strategy applied in ABC-2 unit has had a significant effect in reducing432
the MCP value in all of the time intervals. As can be observed in Figure 6, that λMCPt,e433
value is higher than λ′MCPt,e in more than 96% of time intervals when H-MGs operate434
independently without coalition. In particular, the difference between them under435
{AB} and {ABC} scenarios has respectively reached 79% and 92% of time intervals;436
considering that it has undergone even more intense reduction under {UG} scenario437
up to 33% of time intervals than any other scenario.438
The maximum and minimum values of MCPs have also had significant reduction439
in all the possible scenarios as seen in Figure 6. This is while the maximum value440
of λ′MCPt,e unlike λ
MCP
t,e is reached to a value between 4% to 28% of its initial value in441
all the possible scenarios. In addition, the minimum value of λ′MCPt,e has shown more442
reduction relative to λMCPt,e (between 17% and 96%) in all the possible scenarios. The443
double coalition formation among H-MGs undoubtedly had considerable effect in444
lowering the maximum values of MCP especially with respect to the case that H-MGs445
are allowed to work more independently. This is while the maximum value of MCP446
is negligibly increased under triple (grand) coalition, i.e. {ABC}, but its minimum447
value is significantly reduced under this scenario. This shows that grand coalition448
among H-MGs is a critical decision criterion which needs to be carefully idealized449
at all the times. For instance, comparison of values in Figs. 5 and 6 shows that450
when MCP has its maximum value under all scenarios, MSSP-ABC algorithm has451
tried to motivate the customers shift their energy demand to off-peak period when452
MCP is lower, and when it is more convenient for the H-MG to distribute electricity.453
The minimum values of λMCPt,e and λ
′MCP
t,e have occurred at the early hours of the454
day (except {AB}) and at the end of the day in all possible scenarios, respectively.455
The values of λMCPt,h and λ
′MCP
t,h obtained by ABC-1 and ABC-2 units are compared in456
Figure 7 to address inter-operability between multiple-coalition in H-MGs.457
The comparison of the profit profiles earned by each H-MG and upstream grid458
under different scenarios are shown in Figure 8. As observed, H-MG A has achieved459
its highest profit in an individual operation (i.e. {A}) and gained less profit under460
scenarios {AB} and {AC}, about 30% and 41%, respectively. This highlights that461
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Figure 6: Electrical MCPs for mutual inter-operability schemes or independent function
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even the sum of the profits of H-MGs A and B is reduced by 26% under {AB}, be-462
cause, forming the coalition {AB} not only has decreased the profit of each one of463
H-MGs A and B, but also has reduced the obtained total profit. This is while the464
value of MCP in more than 58% of the time intervals is significantly reduced rela-465
tive to the scenarios in which the H-MGs A and B operate as inter-operable parts. In466
fact, interoperability of the H-MGs is offered by the Proposed MSSP-ABC algorithm467
where the excess energy of one H-MG can be stored or momentarily consumed in468
another H-MG. On the other hand, although {AB} has had negative effect over the469
profit obtained from H-MGs A and B, it has had positive effect over the MCP value.470
In grand coalition schemes, similar conditions have occurred and a 57% decrease in471
the value of total profit has been obtained from forming coalition. However, in 50%472
of time intervals, the value of MCP in {ABC} is less than its value in the scenarios473
when H-MGs operate, independently. Regarding {BC} and {AC}, these results can474
also be reversed. It means that the total profit from {AC} and {BC} has respectively475
increased by 40% and 60% relative to the H-MGs operating completely indepen-476
dent. This is while the values of MCP after forming coalitions {AC} and {BC} have477
respectively reduced for about 46% and 58% of time intervals, relative to the H-MGs478
independent operation. In other words, forming coalition would not only increase479
the participation rate of H-MG owners and consumers in the deregulated market,480
but can also be considered to smooth the fluctuation of load demands. It is impor-481
tant to mention that the profit obtained from forming coalition by upstream grid482
has become less than the H-MGs in an individual operation which requires opti-483
mization for inter-operable routines. This means that during coalition formation484
among H-MGs, they have bought less power from the upstream grid and they have485
supplied their needed power from their partners as much as possible.486
5. CONCLUSION487
In this paper, an optimal, autonomous, and distributed bidding-based energy488
optimization scheduling algorithm is proposed in order to maximize the profit and489
energy balancing efficiency of H-MGs under residential loads, in specific when mul-490
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Figure 8: Obtained profit profiles by H-MGs and upstream grid under solitary or coalitional H-MGs
tiple H-MGs are trying to share their DER energy resources to create a reliable sup-491
ply of sustainable energy. Unlike most of the previous strategies that focus solely492
on the interactions between the utility companies and conventional buildings, the493
basis of the proposed design is the interactions among the H-MG to help increase494
their overall energy efficiency infrastructure, to reduce the energy costs as well as to495
improve the profit of both supplier and buyer. The proposed algorithm uses inter-496
active H-MGs communication which maximizes profits either operated separately497
or in a group. In order to encourage H-MGs to behave in a way consistent with the498
group′s interests, (i.e., inter-operatible coalition formation) a smart pricing tariff499
should be implemented such that the interactions among the H-MGs automatically500
lead to an optimal load profile with optimal DER scheduling and/or lower MCP.501
Some of the proposed algorithm advantages are:502
1) to selectively identify within multiple H-MGs not only the amount of their503
energy consumption at each hour of the day, but also the portion of the energy504
desired to obtain from each available energy resource under individual operation505
or as coalition formation. 2) to facilitate influencing energy consumption levels506
in each H-MG through coalition formation. This support can be accomplished by507
introducing impetus energy cost functions. These energy cost functions depends on508
not only the energy production by DERs inside each H-MG, but also on the amount509
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of MCP, the energy consumption, and the energy production by other H-MGs in the510
multiple H-MG systems.511
Interoperability of the H-MGs is offered by the proposed market structure where512
the excess energy of one H-MG can be stored in their ES/TES or momentarily con-513
sumed/sold in another H-MG/ upstream grid when MCP is relatively high or during514
coalition formation. In essence, it is proposed that MSSP-ABC algorithm is effective515
in reducing the peak demand and the value of MCP while simultaneously contribut-516
ing to gain a greater profit under coalition formation, in comparison with individual517
operation of H-MG. The reduction is achieved in peak demand which depends on518
the load participation in RLD operation during peak hours, the appropriate value519
of MCP and the profit earned by H-MG under individual operation or as coalition520
formation which is globally implementable for a range of energy management, op-521
timization and trading applications in smart multiple H-MGs. The presented archi-522
tecture and simulation results confirmed the applicability of the proposed algorithm523
to power management and trading in smart multiple H-MGs.524
In future work, the authors are planning to improve market operation by inte-525
grating the possibility of coalition formation among consumers. Additionally, physi-526
cal constraints of the network, such as voltage at different locations and power flow527
through lines, will be formulated as an optimal power flow problem.528
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